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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
ST;._TE OF UTAH

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE GRA>JITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a
body politic of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Apoellant,
Case :-ro. 17175
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic and ARTHUR MONSON,
Salt Lake County Treasurer,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on appeal before the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah seeking judicial review of a Judgment after
=~ial

before the Third Judicial District Court of the State of

Utah and upon decisions rendered by Judge David K. Winder upon
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to determine liability and
Judge Jay E. Banks upon trial for damages.

The Judgment herein

reversed Judgment of David K. Winder, determined no liability
for damages and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint.
DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff-Appellant sought judgment for damages and injunctive relief agair.st Defendants concerning the timely transfer of property tax funds collected by Defendants for and on behalf
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of Plaintiff-_C\ppellant and the transfer to Plaintiff-Appellant
of all interest income earned on Plaintiff-Appellant's funds
during the period that Defendant held those funds.

Original ac:

was brought by Plaintiff-Appellant concerning the tax years 19:
1974 and 1975.

First Amended Complaint included claims for th;

tax year 1976.

Plaintiff-Appellant brought Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment to determine liability for improper transfer
funds from Defendants to Plaintiff.

Judge David X. Winder on

May 6, 1977 granted partial Summary Judgment as to liability
and referred the issues of damages to trial.

Plaintiff filed

its Second Amended Complaint alleging grounds for damages.

Tri:

followed and Judge Jay E. Banks vacated and overruled the dec1s:
of Judge David K. Winder and found no liability and consequenti
no damages and no grounds for injunctive relief and dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint.

Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff petitions this court to reverse the decision of
the Third Judicial District Court, Judge Jay E. Banks presidinc,
reinstate the decision of Judge David K. Winder and remand for
trial for proper findings on damages and injunctive relief.
Damages to be based upon the trust relationship

of Defendants

to Plaintiff and injunctive relief to be based upon the

stat~~

requirements for the proper transfer of funds collected by one
political entity for and on behalf of another.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(Summary of Facts)
Granite School District is dependent upon Salt Lake County
for the collection of property taxes.

During the years 1973,

through 1977 Salt Lake County Treasurer collected the property
taxes and held the funds collected for lengthy periods beyond the
statutory transfer dates.

While the funds were held by the Salt

Lake County Treasurer, the funds were earning interest income
which was given by the Treasurer to Salt lake County by deposit
to the county's general fund.

Granite School District seeks in-

junctive relief that all funds collected be timely transferred
pursuant to statute and that Salt Lake County pay over to Granite
School District the interest income that it unjustly received.
FACTS IN DETAIL
The Salt Lake County Treasurer is charged by statute to
collect property taxes for all taxing districts within the county.
The Treasurer is reimbursed for his expenses pursuant to statute
and he is required to disburse those funds on a regular basis
Llntil the final adjustment day on the last day of March of each year.
1.

Transfer Practice.

In 1973, the last year of Salt Lake

County Treasurer Sid Lambourne's term of office, the property tax
collected by him was transferred to the Granite School District
as shown in Exhibit 2P as follows:
~=ansfer~ed

Date Transferred

.Arr.aunt

December 13, 1973

$ 5,853,000.00

January 2, 1974

140,000.00

January 7, 1974

4,024,000.00
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Date Transferred

l\.mount Transferred

February 1, 1974

$ 1,646,000.00
19,869.69

February 27, 1974

2,066,886.32

May 28, 1974

$13,749,756.01

TOTAL
2.

Transfer Dates.

out by statute.

There are three transfer dates set

In Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §53-7-10, re-

quires that the County Treasurer pay the funds collected
to the Board of Education within 30 days after the taxes are
collected.

In Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §59-10-66 requires

all funds in the treasurer's hands collected for and due the
School District be paid to the treasurer of the School District,
each month.

And in this same section

(§59-10-66)

the final

costs are set on the last day of March of each year. #l
3.

1974 - 1977 Transfer ?ractice.

With the entry intc

office of Salt Lake Treasurer Arthur Monson, the transfer practice of his office went fron bad to worse as follows:
Date Transferred

(Exhibit F·

Amount Transferred

December 2 I 1974

$

December 3 I 1974

142,000.00
56,200.00

December 16, 1974

2,900,000.00

December 19, 1974

5,000,000.00

January 9 I 1975

3,000,000.00

January 31, 1975

3,000,000.00

June 12, 1975

1,224,128.14

TOTAL

$15,322,328.14
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Date Transferred

1975
Amount Transferred

December 2' 1975

$

December 15, 1975

1,561,453.00
10,000,000.00

January 5' 1976

3,015,643.00

Februa:::-y 3' 1976

163,001.00

March 31, 1976

1,876,367,51

June 15, 1976

54,201.86

December 17, 1976

16,018.38

TOTAL
Date Transferred
December 7 I

$ 16,686,684.75

1976

1976

Amount Transferred
$

1,767,700.00

December 13, 1976

9,713,500.00

December 17, 1976

384,963.33

December 28, 1976

692,000.00

January 4, 1977

252,000.00

March 31, 1977

2,842,945.17

TOTAL

$ 18,029,608.50

Keeping in mind that by November 30th of each year Salt
Lake County collected 99431292% of 1973 taxes, 99274363% of 1974
taxes, 98586137% of 1975 taxes and 98168721% of 1976 taxes
(Exhibit P-2). (Finding No. 8)
~.

Investment Practice.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer

began investing all funds received in his collections in 1974.
Taking great pride in his investment increases to public funds
and then promptly determined that no taxing district was more

- 5 -
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appropriate to receive this windfall from his accurnen and
expertise than was the Salt Lake County general fund to meet
the expenses of Salt Lake County government.

Admittedly,

Salt Lake County was only one of the 48 taxing districts for
whom he made collections (trp. 721 Finding No. 4), but after
all, it was the county government that hired his staff, paid
his salary, arranged his office accommodations and in general
accompanied his concert.

Only one principal governed.

If ycJ

have extra money, give it to the people who will do you the most
good.

That's called the scratch-my-back method of political

survival

a~d

the Salt Lake County Treasurer followed that ?ath

to the very penny of income earned.
5.

(Finding No. 34).

The School District's Dilemma.

A school district

depends upon a ronthly flow of cash to meet its financial
commitments.

But, its major source of funds is property tax

collections which accrue only once each year and are paid by
November 30th of each year.
75 million dollars.

For 1980, that will be approximate!

So the school district anticipates its cash

flow demands by selling tax anticipation notes and by budgeting
into its income projections interest income earned on the funds
received at one time but needed only proportionately
the year.

througho~

When the property tax funds are collected but not

transferred and the income earned but not paid over the

b~dcet0

the school district becomes of little use, the proJections

ha~

no validity and the cash flow becomes an unmanageable problen.
(trp 619).
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fj.

The Proposed Solution.

The transfer of funds is as

close to a mathmatical exercise in accounting as any procedure.
Upon fixing of the mill levy and the evaluation, the percentage
of all funds to be collected and the actual dollar figure auailable
to the school district from the total collectable is accurately
determinable.

All of which is accomplished prior to assessment

of taxes in October of each year.

The slight fluctuations of

abatements, redemptions or defaults cause a very minute change in
that accounting, the last day of March of each year was set as
the adjustment date for transfer of proportionate shares of delinquent taxes, interest, penalty, and costs which is to be accomplished monthly and finally on the last adjustment date.

No one

ever said that over-payment by the County Treasurer to a taxing
district could not be as easily corrected or adjusted as underpayment.

(TR640).

The only thing that was left to the responsibility

of the parties was the transfer also of the income received from the
funds from funds investment.

The hypothetical emphasises the problem.

In 1980, Salt Lake County will collect within a few dollars of
$165,000,000 in property tax collections.

Twenty-three percent of

that amount or within a few dollars of $75,000,000 is collected
for the Granite School District based upon assessed valuations and
mill levy set by the School District.
L.a.~~,2

Granite School District should

2_~, ~ ~fall r2ce=._pts ~rans:er:!:"ed ur::cn col~ection which is within

20 C:a~·s from actual receiDt and on the first day of each month of all

funds actually in hand collected.
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7.

The Repayment of

I~come

Earned but not Paid Over.

The final fact is that the School District has

~ot

received

the interest income earned on funds belonging to the School
Usi~.:

District which income was paid over to Salt Lake County.

the county's figures of their income and the amounts actually
earned 1974 through 1977, the county obtained $83, 000 in

inco~,

which was not earned on county funds collected but from the
collected for the School District.

f~~

That amount plus legal

interest should be reimbursed to the School District for the
tax years 1974 through 1976. (Finding No. 34)
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the decision of liability rendered by the

lower court could properly be vacated and overruled by a dee is.:
of the same court charged with considering the bifurcated
issue of damages.
2.

Whether Defendants-Respondents properly transferred

to Plaintiff-Appellant funds collected for Plaintiff within

t~

statutory transfer periods pursuant to the statutory requiremer.:
3.

Whether interest income received from investment of

Plaintiff's funds was improperly transferred to Defendant Salt
Lake County to its unjust enrichment.
4.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief

to require the proper trar.s:'er o:': all funds collected plus ear:'
income within 30 days after the funds are collected, and by the
first day of each month of all funds in hand actually collectec
with a final adjustment on the last day of March of each year.

- 8 -
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ARGUMENT
"Your money is the County's money because I say so."

so

the Salt Lake County Treasurer approaches his statutory responsibility of collecting taxes for 49 taxing districts in Salt
Lake County.

Not only does he keep the collections to the last

possible moment to enhance his investment image, but then he gives
the income to anyone he pleases.

What he really says is,

money is the County's money because I say so."

"Your

Thus began the

unsavory task of telling the Treasurer that he misappropriated
earned income by seeking judicial decision of two basic questions.
How long can the Treasurer hold the collected funds and who should
get the benefit of the income earned on invested funds.
POINT I
wI-IETHER THE DECISION OF LIABILITY RENDERED BY THE LOWER
COURT COULD PROPERLY BE VACATED AND OVERRULED BY A DEC IS ION OF THE SAME COURT CHARGED WITH CONSIDERING THE
BIFURCATED ISSUE OF DAMAGES.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah "shall have appellate
jurisdiction ... to review all final judgments of the District Court ..
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and
fact ... "

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §78-2-2.

The District Court "shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters and ... appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts .. "
Lltah Code Annotated, 1953 §78-3-4.
The bifurcation of issues is discretionary with the trial
court.

Having bifurcated the issues the final judgment in the

- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case would have to be entered before any appeal could be taken.
Twin Falls County vs. Knieval, 563P2d 45,98 Idaho 321 (1977) anc
partial determinations based on motion which dispose of only pa:·
of the issues are not final judgments for appeal.

Lopez v.

Hoffman, 4 2 3 P 2 d 4 2 9 , 77 N .1'!. 3 9 6 ( 196 2) .
The issues bifurcated for discussion provided a basis
for carrying the case to its final decision on the whole case
and not on a piecemeal appeal of each bifurcated issue.

The

tt~

court takes each portion and renders decision until the whole
case is completed and ripe for appeal.

Gazin v. Hieber, 504

P2d 1178, 8 Wash. App. 104 (1972) and Wheatland Irrigation Distri::

v. McGuire, 537 P2d 1128, hearing granted in part 552 P2d 1115
rehearing 562 P2d 287 (Wyo. 1975). and Hayes v. Nielsen, 568
P2d 905

(Wyo. 1977).

The granting of summary judgment as to

liability was not a "final order" but was "interlocutory" until
after the case was tried on the issues of damages.

The same car.·

cl us ion was reached in Empress Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Price, 567
P2d 350, 116 Ariz. 34

(1977).

The final judgment for appeal was

after the trial on damages following the partial summary judgment
as to liability.

See also North Point Consol.

Utah S.L. Canal Co. 63 P812, 23 Utah 199

(Utah, 1901),

Steam Laundry v. Dale, 58P.1109, 20 Utah 469
&

Irrigation Co. v.
Standa~

(1899), and J.B.

R.E. Walker, Inc. vs. Thayn, 405 P2d 342, 17 Ut.2d 120 (1965).

Appellant review was not that of the trial court as to is gra~~
of partial summary judgment but was the responsibility of the

- 10 -
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Supreme Court after the proper determination of damages and
a completion of the case as a whole with the entry of final
judgment as to all remaining issues to be tried on a trial
court level eminating for the trial court's original jurisdiction.
The S·upreme Court of the State is the proper forum for
review of the whole case after final determination of each of
the parts of the case.
576 P2d 748

Mid-Century Inc., Co. v. Pavlikowski

(Nev. 1977) Central-Southwest Dairy Co-op v. American

Bank of Commerce, 432 P2d 820, 78 N.M. 464 (1967) and Bowing

v.

Board of Trustees of Green River Community College, Dist. No.
X, 534 P2d 1365, 85 Wash. 2d 300 (1975).
The final determination of liability was made herein by
Judge David K. Winder.

It had the quality of res judicada as it

was fully determanitive of that issue.

It was not subject to

interlocutory review but awaited finalization of the whole case.
Clouver s. Spaniol Ford, Inc., 522 P2d 1360 (Wyo. 1979) as
evidenced by defendants' Notice of Intent to Appeal upon completion of the whole case.
POINT II
WHETHER DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS PROPERLY TR.~NSFERRED
FUNDS COLLECTED FOR PLAINTIFF WITHIN THE STATUTORY
TRANSFER PERIODS PURSUANT TO THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
Judge Winder made the following findings and conclusions
concerning the improper withholding of funds from transfer to
the School District:
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Findings of Fact
"l.

The County Treasurer, pursuant to statute (53-7-10,

UCA, 1953), is required to levy property taxes in the Granite
School District at the rate set by the School District within
the requirements set by law, collect the taxes and pay the same
to the treasurer of the Granite School District within thirty
days after the taxes are collected.
2.

The county Treasurer, pursuant to statute (59-10-66,

UCA, 1953), shall pay to the Treasurer of Granite School Distric:.
on the first day of each month, all monies in the Treasurer's
hands collected for and due the School District.
3.

Any monies of the Granite School District collected

and held by the County Treasurer for more than thirty (30) days
is a violation of state law and all monies held by the County
Treasurer for the Granite School District during any given monb
should be paid over to the Granite School District on the first
day of the subsequent month.
4.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer levied and collected

property taxes for and in behalf of the Granite School District
in each of the tax years of 1973 through 1976.
5.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer held monies collected

for and in behalf of the Granite School District for more than
thirty (30) days and did not pay to the Granite School District,
monies which it held in the months of the tax years 1973 throug~
1976, on the first day of the month following the month the monW
were collected.

- 12 -
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer is required (and has

been so required since at least 1973) to pay to the Treasurer
of the Granite School District within thirty (30) days after
collection of property taxes by Defendant, the Plaintiff's share
of said taxes.
2.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer collected certain prop-

erty taxes for each of the tax years 1973 through 1976, which the
Salt Lake County Treasurer failed to pay to Plaintiff within the
required thirty (30) day period.
3.

The Salt Lake County Treasurer having failed to pay

to Plaintiff the property taxes collected for and in its behalf,
caused the Plaintiff damages in each of those tax years.
4.

No finding, conclusion or ruling is made by this courrt

concerning the amount of those damages or what the proper measure
of damages should be.
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted
and Plaintiff is hereby awarded Summary Judgment against Defendant
finding the Defendant liable to Plaintiff for failure on the
Defendant's part to pay to Plaintiff within the required thirty
(30) day period, the property taxes collected by Defendant for
each of the tax years, 1973 through 1976, which were collected by
Defendant for and in behalf of Plaintiff pursuant to law."
It is generally accepted law that where two statutes treat

- 13 -
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the same subject the court will endeavor to interpret both
to be valid and not contradictory.

Park and Recreation Cornrnissi:

v. Department of Finance 388 P2d 233, 15 Ut. 2d 110 (1964).
State vs. Hunt, 368 P2d 261, 13 Ut. 2d 32

(1962).

All statutes

should be viewed liberally with an intent to effect the objects
of the statutes.
The object is to harmonize the statutes in accordance.witi
the objective to make the statute carry out the intent and purpose of the law. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty 68 P2d 242
(Utah, 1980).
The two statutes governing in this action as previously
cited are 53-7-10 and 59-10-66#

1

Considering as a fact that 99% of all property taxes are
paid by November 30th of each year and acknowledging that it
a few days to process the payments received.

t~

These two statuteo

are to be construed to give validity to the process of collecL
and to the proper payment of funds over to the separate entitic'
for whom the funds were collected.

Using the term "collected"

as the day on which the payments were made and the term "in hanc
collected" as the actual date on which the collected funds weu
deposited to the account of the County Treasurer.

The two

are wholly compatible and give complete guidance to the

sU~

Coun~

Treasurer as to the proper payment of funds collected for the
School District.
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u.c.;... §S3-7-10 (1953) i:irovides;
A~ter the evaluation of proi:ierty has been extended on
the assessment rolls, the county commissio er shall levy a
tax on the taxable property in the respect ve school districts
at such a rate as will, subject to limitat ons hereinafter set
forth and as nearly may be, raise the amounts required by each
board of education.
Such taxes shall be collected and the county
treasurer shall i:iay the same to the treasurer of said board within
thirty days after it is collected, who shall hold the same subject to the order of the Board of education.

In addition, U.C.A.

§

59-10-66

(1953) provides:

It is the duty of the county treasurer to pay to the
other treasurer of each city, town, school district, and other
taxing unit of the county, on the first day of each month,
all monies in his ha!1ds collected for and due such city, town,
school or taxing unit.
The county treasurer shall pay to the
treasurer of each city, town school district or other taxing
unit, a proportionate share of delinquent taxes, interest, penalty,
and costs on all tax sales and redemptions therefrom monthly, and
shall make a final settlement with the differing taxing units
on the last day of March of each year. (Emphasis Added.)

14a
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of school land "must" be made within 90 dai'S of filing cf plat
held not mandatory); State ex rel Right v.
District, 133 P.128

(Utah 1913);

Park City School

(statute requiring tir.1ely he:::

anC. filing of report as condition for subdivided school distric:
is merely advisoty); Tanner 'l. Nelson, 70 P.

984

(Utah 1902)

(statute calling for public meeting on bonds for funding schocl
textbooks considered directory only) .
A careful reading of the above cases that they merely
lend support to the argument of the Plaintiff that the intent

c:

the legislature is the most fundamental rule of statutory coc·
struction.

In addition, all of these cases may be distinguishe,:

from the i:1stant case in that there was no shewing of substant:;
prejudice or injury to any of the interested parties as a result of failure to strictly comply with the statutes i!1 ':['cest:'.:
POINT III
WHETHER INTEREST r::co~ 1 :r: RECE:'.YED ??0' 1 I:l\.'ESTclE'.''.T
OF PLAINTIFF' s n;:;os :;;,s r:'.PROPE'.l.LY T"'.<JSFERRED
TO DEFENDANT Sf.LT LC,.I\E CC'..":·iTY TO ITS CY-.JCST Ei:RICHMENT.
With respect to the collection and

trans~er

cf

the

~a~

monies in question, the county treasurer has acted as an agent
of Salt Lake County.
U.C.A. §17-5-19

(1953)

provides:

"They [Board of County Comrnissioners] supervise
the official conduct of all county officers and
officers cf all precincts, districts and other
subdivisions of the county (except municipal corporations); see that they faithfully perform their
duty, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and if
necessary, require them to renew their official
bonds, make reports and present their books and
accounts for inspection."
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I

It is clear that the above statute provides the Board of
county Commissioners with authority to exercise general supervision over the County Treasurer.
59 P.2d 1155

(Utah 1936).

Tooele County v. De LaMare,

The fact that the County Treasurer is

subject to general direction by County Commissioners makes Salt
Lake County more than just an "unwilling" recipient of the property tax monies and interest thereon.
As a general rule, where a person acts for another who
accepts and retains the benefits of the transaction, such other
is deemed to ratify the transaction.
Son, 230 P. 2d 571
§175, at 560

Moses v. Archie McFarland &

(Utah 1951.); see also 3 Am. Jur. 2nd Agency

(1962).

A principal, after receiving information

that an act has been done without actual authority by one acting
on its behalf, must promptly elect to repudiate the act, if he
wishes to avoid being bound as a principal.

Moses v. Archie

McFarland & Son, supra; see also 3 Am. Jur. 2nd Agency §175, at
560

(1952).
The following facts are established.

Salt Lake County has

been fully informed by virtue of this action that the Salt Lake
County Treasurer has failed to pay over tax monies when due.
Further, Salt Lake County has knowingly and consistently accepted
all interest accrued on overdue tax monies.

The County has never

repudiated the acts of the County Treasurer with respect to the
handling of tax monies, nor has it offered to return any of the
accrued interest withheld by the County Treasurer contrary to statute.

- 18 -
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The County's acquiescence in the conduct of the County
Treasurer clearly shows ratification of the Treasurer's conduc:
in this matter.

On this basis alone, the County is liable

:0 ~

the Treasurer's acts.
Even if the County Tre.asurer is not the agent of Salt Lak,
County, the County may not unjustly enrich itself at the ex 8 en~
of the District.
Defendants in their trial brief have acknowledged that
the County Treasurer "may indeed be a trustee of Plaintiff's
tax monies." (p.26,tr

~ 2 ~~~eed,

they would have difficulty in mab-

taining a contrary position in the light of Board of Education•.
Daines, 166 p.977 (Utah 1917).

In Daines, the Court held that

the County Treasurer had no right to be compensated for expenses

I
incurred in the collection of school property taxes from the til
monies due the school.

In the course of its discussion, the

Court stated:
"School funds in this state, in one sense,
are deemed trust funds, and, under our laws,
are to be devoted strictly far school purposes."
Id., at 979.
Plaintiff has previously contended by virtue of Utah law
that the County Treasurer is an agent of Salt Lake County, and
that the Treasurer and the County Commissioner acted as a single
entity in this matter.

Assuming, arguendo, that the above facts

are not the case, Salt Lake County, as recipient of the transfer
of trust funds, should not be allowed to retain the income earne:
on tax monies in question.
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The Restatement of Trusts
"If the trustee
property and no
transferee does
although he had

(2d)

§289

(1958)

states:

in breach of trust, transfers trust
value is given to the transferor, the
not hold the property free of the trust,
no notice of the trust."

In such a case as described in the above quotation, the
beneficiary can charge the transferee as a constructive trustee
of the property, and the transferee will be liable for profits
from investment of the money, or at the very least, interest
upon the transferred funds at the legal rate.

Id, at §292.

Utah courts of law recognize the equitable doctrine of
constructive trusts.
511

See e.g. Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d

(Utah 1965).
During the years in question, the County retained interest

earned on tax monies improperly withheld in violation of state
statutes.

The tax monies gathered by the Treasurer were and are

trust funds.

Interest on the funds has been retained, and

credited to the account of the County.

The County's retention of

the funds is a classic case of unjust enrichment.

Accordingly,

the County should be obliged to pay over any income received upon
the tax monies in question.
The funds so held for the School District are funds held
in trust.

Salt Lake County is a trustee of tax monies collected

for Granite School District.

Finding No. 16.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trust is sufficiently
established where "(the)

trust estate is definite, the trustee

is certain, and the purpose of the trust and use of the fund is
definite, certain and particularly characterized."

Duchesne

County v. State Tax Commission, 140 P. 2d 335, 337-38

A public agency may serve as a trustee.

(Utah, 1943) ·

Id. Utah statutes govern-
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ing the collection, use, and disposition of tax monies col
on behalf of school districts demonstrate that counties hole
such monies in trust.
In State v. Stanton County, 161 N.W. 264

(Neb. 1917),

the State of Nebraska brought an action to recover from Stanton
County, the board and care of patients committed to the state
The county was authorized by state,,

hospital from said county.

upon being notified of the charges for its patients in the
state hospital to add such charges to the next state tax to be
levied in the county and to then pay the amounts that were le''ii
into the state treasury.

The county levied the tax but then

~-

clined to pay the tax proceeds into the state treasury.

The~~

held that it was obligated to do so indicating that the

county~

the money in trust for the state.

As a consequence, the court

ruled that the county was liable for interest on the monies

~r~

the time that it was due to be paid to the state:
The money was collected for, and belonged to, the State,
and was wrongfully withheld by the county.
While so
wrongfully held, the county is properly chargeable
with the use of the money and should pay interest
thereon as found by the referee.
Id. at 266.
In State v. City and County of Milwaukee, 149 N.W. 579
(Wisc. 1914), the state as plaintiff sued the city for the
amount of fines received by the city in its courts and payable
to the state.

The court stated that the funds were trust ~

and held that where the city had failed to pay the state the
amount of fines collected by it, interest was due from the tirne
the funds were to be paid.
197 A. 50 (N.J. 1934)

Id. at 583; see also Booth v. Pa~

(city ordered to pay interest on delay~

tax
payment
to Law
county)
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In sum, both ~tah stat~tes and the common law impose the
office and duties of a public trustee upon political subdivision,
such as Salt Lake County, which hold tax monies collected for
other units of government.
The state laws provide for funding of a basic school pro0ram based on a formula called a weighted pupil unit.

Each year

that basic program is met from assessment of real property taxes
within the School District augmented by the state supplied funds
?ursuant to limits established by the legislature.

The School

District is then left with the responsibilities of administering
these funds.

Whatever the School District earns on these funds

by investment, or obtains by a gift, or from other means such
as tax anticipation notes or sale of property or student fees
are funds left to the discretional use of the School Board but
are to be used for School District purposes only.

Board of

Education vs. Daines, Ibid. Such extraordinary funds have never
been accounted for in determining the basic school program dictated by the state weighted pupil formula.
For Salt Lake County to allege that a windfall of income
is the County's by way of the state already supporting the basic
school program is to allege that unjust enrichment is all right
as long as someone else picks up the deficit or curtails their
cro8rams so that the county can take advantage of its wrongful
3ccrocriation of those funds.

Public policy dictates the separation

of governmental entities and the separate responsibility of managing
the tax payers funds under their care.

-
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The issue of whether a county holds schooi district fir,.J:
in public trust ha.s been di.:::-ectly 1 i tigated r.0w in at least
other neighboring jurisdiction.
Payne,

50 P.2d 822

t~<:

Pomona City School District "

---.:.·

(Cal. ,\pp. 1935).

In Pomona Ci.":.~',

the sc~oc

district, plaintiff, maintained its school '.'unds on deposit in
the treasury of Los Angeles County.

The County Treasurer foL:.·.

the administrative practice of depositing the funds in state a:.:
national banks pursuant to state statutes.

However, the co11n<:·

treasurer did not credit the school district with any of the i:.·
terest earned on school funds.

The Pomona School District s1ec'.

claiminc a right to the interest on that portion of school dist::
funds which represented its share.

The c'.Jurt framed the issues

as follows:
Decision of this case we believe rests upon the determination of the status of the school funds while
they are in the custody oc the county.
Is the county
the owner of such '.'u:. ::o, ~r is tl".e :::::c·~:.t~· s:..::-.:cl·' the
trustee for the bene~~~ of che schcc~ ~istric~?
If
accretions belong to such owner; but es trustee,
the cc;..;.r--.t:z· r,.;ould ha~:e nc ownershi;:::. -·· '::he :~:-:ds or
in their interest incre~ents.
I~. at 823.
The

co~rt

held that the countv was

~erely

a trustee of

the school funds deposited in its care, and as such, could not
enrich its own coffers with interest increments upon money place:
in its custody by the school district.

It indicated that its

decision rested not only on statutory interpretation, but also
on general common law principles.

Id. at 825.

California and other courts have applied Pomona School
District in analogous situations.
Adams, 32 Cal. 2d 620, 197 P.2d 543
P.2d 946

Metropolitan Water

Distric~·

(1948); Ostly v. Saper, 30)

(Cal. App. 1957); Board of La"-1 Library Trustees of Les

Angeles County v. Lorery, 154 P.2d 719

(Cal. App. 1945).
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2 3 ...,

See

3

lso, Lynn v. Longview, 131 P.2d 164 (\·;ash. 1942).
In State of Missouri ex rel Fort Zumwalt School District,

et al, Realtors vs. Dichherker Auditor of St. Charles County
and St. Charles Missouri, 576 So. 2 2d 532 (Mo. Feb. 13, 1979)
~he

Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed a Writ of Mandamus filed

by the Circuit Court which ordered the County Auditor to transfer
o~er

interest income earned on School District funds at the

tix0 as the funds themselves were transferred.

-
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sa~e

"This is an appeal by appellant, Dickherber, the auditor
of St. Charles County from a writ of mandamus entered on .!lay

c:,

1977 by the circuit court of St. Charles County commanding the
appellant to countersign checks or warrants issued by the
treasurer or collector of St. Charles County for the payment of
interest on school tax monies collected by the county."
"This proceeding has a long history and involves an
interpretation of law relating to the payment of interest on
school tax monies received and deposited by the proper officials
of St. Charles County.

The precise issue is whether the interes:

on school tax monies deposited in authorized depositaries

shou~

be paid to the treasurers of various school districts in the

county or whether such interest should be credited to the gener::I
revenue fund of the county."
Realtors prayed that the circuit court issue its writ of
mandamus commanding the treasurer and collector to "forthwith
deliver to each Treasurer-Relator interest earned on tax monies
received by Respondents in behalf of each Relater-School Distric'
."Respondents answered and relied upon §52 360 RSMo 1969
n2 contending that such interest "shall go to the general revenu<
fund of the County."

Respondents contended that it is the duey

of the collector to transfer interest on all funds to the credit
of the general revenue fund of the county.
The circuit court made its alternative writ absolute and
ordered and enjoined respondents to pay to relators school distr::

- 25 -
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the interest earned on all school tax monies received and invested by them.
The Missouri statutes dealing with payment of funds to
the school districts are not much different than those of Utah
in that a regular monthly day is set for payment ("at least
once in every month", 165.071 R.S. Mo., 1969).

The Missouri

statutes provided for disposal of interest income earned on
the general county funds to the general revenue fund of the
county but such requirement was not statutorily applied to funds
collected for the school district.
The court held that the trial court did not err in issuing
the writ and that the interest on deposited school tax funds go
to the respective treasurers of the relator school districts
cather than to the general revenue fund of St. Charles County.
"The resolution we make comports with the general
principle that the interest on public funds designated for a
specific purpose follows those funds in the absence of an unequivocal legislative expression otherwise.

See annotation,143

A.L.R. 1341, 1342 (1943); State Highway Commission v. Spainhower,
504

s.w.

2d 121 (Mo. 1973); Pomona City School District v. Payne,

50 P.2d 822

(Cal. App. 1935).

In Pomona, the court expressed

the principle in terms of the applicability to school funds.
The issues were similar to the present case, and involved t.he
question whether the interest on school funds was to go to the
county or to the school district.

In the course of the opinion

the court stated:

-
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"lie are also confronted with the primary law that interes:
is an accretion or increment to the principal fund earning it,
and unless lawfully separated therefrom becomes a part thereof
. This was the common-law rule, and unless the cl.eposi tarj'
acts clearly demonstrate an intention to deprive school distnc:;
of such common-law right to interest accruals, they should reta:·
such interest."

50 P.2d at 825.

See also State Highway Co!1'.m1s 0.

v. Spainhower, supra.
"We, therefore, conclude that based upon statutory interpretation and public policy that interest on deposited school
funds are payable to the treasurer of the six-director school
districts and that the trial court did not err."
State Highway Commission v. Spainhower 504 S .1'7. 2d 121
(Mo. 1973). Involved an action for declaratory judgment with
regard to whether interest on state road funds should be paid
into such fund.

The circuit court found that the interest and

income frame investment of the fund had to be credited to such
fund and not diverted to the general revenue.

The issue is whet:·

interest from investment of the state road fund must be credited
by the State Treasurer to the state road fund to be used for
highway purposes as contended by the Highway Cornrnission and as
found by the trial court, or whether such interest is to be ere::
to the general revenue fund as contended by the State Treasure:.
Appellant argues that in the absence of a requirement in Sectic:.

15 that income or interest from the investment of state monies
in a special fund be credited to that fund,

the General Assernb~

- 27
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has the power to provide for the disposition of such increments.
The court found that it was clear that no money was to be diverted from that state road fund for any other use than that for
which the use of the road fund was designated ie. state highway
purposes.

And that interest income on highway funds belonged

to the highway fund.

This problem has been considered and the

same result reached in the State of Oregon where a taxpayer
petitioned for writ of mandamus to compel the state treasurer
to return to the state's general fund certain money accumulated
as interest on several special funds of the state, one of which
was the state highway fund.

The treasurer had credited such

interest to the particular funds involved.

The highway funds

involved were moneys received from various motor vehicle and
fuel taxes.

Article IX, Section 3, Constitution of Oregon,

r2quires that "the proceeds" from any such tax "be used ex:lusively" for the construction and maintenance, etc., "of public
highways, roads and streets within the state of Oregon."
"An examination of all of the authority

* * *

is convincing

that the legislature cannot divert interest from these funds.

* * *
"It is recognized that the people's approval of the amendment to Article IX Section 3 provides no actual expression of a
will and intent that interest that may be earned by the accumulated revenues controlled by the amendment should accrue to the
highway fund.

There is a strong inference, however, that the clear
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intent of the people to compel the specific revenues to be
used for one purpose implies that it would include all of the
terest that would accr'Je during the State Treas•Jrer' s holding,,
s~ate

the revenues for their eventual use."
272,

~00

P.2d 229, 232

§155 ap. 1192:

(ba:tc 196:0).

'i.

Straub, 240 ':r.

See also 81 A C.J.S. States

"Interest earned by a deposit af s9ecial funds

increment accruing thereto, and not to the general funds

c;

oft~

state."
"In Lawson v. Baker(Tex.Civ ..".pp.) 1920, 220 S.IL 260,
the Texas Court held that interest became a part of a similar
highway fund in :Cexas and that the co;csti tutional limi tatiof' :_,.
t~

the Texas Co:tstitution as to the use of the fund prohibited
legislature from diverting the interest away from the fund .
At 143 A.L.R. beginning at page 1341 is an annotation on the
liability of municipalities for interest earned on special

fi,;~.~'

held by the treasurer of the municipality.

ha~

The annotators

collected cases relating to interest on the funds of a school
district or drainage district, for example, held by a county
treasurer.

These cases are significant in that they generally

hold that interest must follow a special fund and be used for

~

benefit of the fund or for the purpose f:::r ·.·i'.ci:::h the ±'und ':1as
created.

See particularly PorrLo:i..a_

1935, 9 Cal.App.2d 510,

50 P.2d

c: +::'

Sch0c2._ District ;;·

!?a~·ne

8~2.

This same cr:i:--.c2-0si_r_:)f', :s to j__:1ter-=:st ·?a~ned on state high',.,'J:

funds is reached by Utah State Attorney General's opinion requiring the Utah State

Treasurer to turn over all interest
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ear~.•

o: 1 state hiqhway funds to the Ctah State Highway Cor:irnission
rather than the depositing of such earned income to the State
general fund.

(Attorney General's opinion No.

dated

19

the
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Under Utah statutes, the property tax levied is to be
collected by the County Treasurer, paid to the Treasurer of
the Board of Education "who shall hold "c:he same subject to
the Order of the Board of Education" Sec.
of Education shall

le~a

53-7-10.

The Board

property tax solely for educational

purposes within the school district. 53-7-8 and 53-7-9 and
53-7-16(a)

and

(b) and 53-7-19 and 53-7-23.

tax levys for designated school purposes.

Each provide for
~he

funds of the

district have no other purposes and are levied under statutory
authority for those purposes only.
Most recently the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed thes;
same issues:_'l_e_a_r_s_·,_•.__
L_i_t_t_l_e_R_o_c_k_S_c_h_o_o_l__D_i_s_~_'-_r_i_c_t_,

593

s. ,,, .

(Ark. Feb. 4, 1980).
School district and others brought action to enjoin operation of ordinance of county quorum court whereby interest on
school taxes was deposited in county general fund and not

pass~

on to the school districts, with defendants asking that school
districts pay a pro rata share of certain expenses incurred
for assessment and collection of the taxes.

The Chancery court

held ordinance illegal and allowed only the assessor to collect
his expenses, and defendants appealed.

In effect, the

ordina~e

provided that the county could use the tax money to earn money
for the

count~--the

interest earned not being passed on to the

school districLs.
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The appellants responded and counterclaimed defending
the legality of the ordinance.

In addition, they asked that

the school districts pay a pro rata share of certain expenses
incurred for the collection of the taxes.

In the case of the

county assessor a claim was made for $37,700 for "rentals and
other contracts" and $38,000 was claimed for ten vehicles used

by the assessor's office.

Over $24,000 was claimed on behalf

of the collector for "rentals and other contracts" and over
$9,000 on behalf of the treasurer for the same expense.

The

proof showed that the appellants' claim for these rentals was
largely based on what the rental value would be of the space
occupied in the Pulaski County Courthouse by these various
county offices.
The chancellor held thattheordinance was illegal,
that the interest earned on such tax money belonged to the legal
entities for which it was collected.

The chancellor also de-

clared that the law provided that only the assessor's office
could charge these entities its expenses and that no other county
officer was authorized to collect for his expenses.

Therefore,

the chancellor denied all requests for charges claimed by county
officers other than the assessor's.

The total amounts claimed

by the assessor, which covered automobiles and the rental value
of space, were allowed.
Mears and the other appellants appeal the judgment of the
chancellor and argue that the use of the tax money to earn interest
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is not prohibited by law and that the chancellor should have
allowed the other county officials to collect for their expenses.

The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's decree.

The Court held:

"Clearly on point is Pomona City School Dist-

rict v. Payne, 9 Cal. App2.d 510, 50 P.2d 822

(1935), which

held that interest on school taxes was part of the principal
and belonged to the schools absent legislative action.

We

relied on Pomona in Miles v. Gordon, 234 Ark. 525, 353 S.W.2d
157 (1962), when we held that Article 16, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which prohibits taking money out of the state
treasury without an appropriation, did not apply to interest on
tax money when the two were separated by legislation.

In

view of Article 16, Section 11, our reasoninq in Miles, and the
absence of legislative action, there is no doubt the interest
belongs to the school districts."
In the State of New Mexico ex rel Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County vs. Monlaya, Director of the State
Department of Finance 575 P.2d 605, 91 N.W. 421(1978)the court
held that interest accruing on proceeds of bonds issued by

co@~

to finance construction of a county juvenile detention home
was required to be used for the purpose for which the bonds weu
issued.

The county argued that there was no statute prohibiti~

the accruina interest
funds.

fro~

The court held:

beina Gsed for

"-'ibo·.i~

~he

general county

a special statc;tory provision,

the general rule is that interest is an accretion or increment
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=o the principal fund earning it and becomes a part of that
~~nd.

The court cited Pamona City School District vs. Payne,

Ibid. Bordy vs. Smith 150 Neb 272, 34 N.W. 2d 331 (1948) and
state v. Straub 240 Oregon 272, 400 P.2d 229 (1963)

(interest

on State School Fund and Cormnissioners of Woburn Cemetary vs.
Treasurer of \1/oburn 64 N.f. 2d 627,

(~lass.,

1946) required that

interest earned on cenetary perpetual care fund should be
keot separate from the county general fund and under the
control of the Cemetary Board.
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POI)JT IV
WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
REQUIRE THE PROPER TR~NSFER OF ALL FUNDS COLLECTED PLes
EARNED INCOME WITHIN 3 0 DAYS .2\FTER THE FUNDS ARE COLLECTE:
AND BY THE FIRST DAY OF EACH MONTH OF ALL FUNDS IN HA~D
.l..CTUALLY COLLECTED WITH A FINAL ACJC'ST~!ENT ON THE LAST o.:·,
OF MARCH OF EACH YEAR.
Injunctive relieve lies in equity when the Salt Lake
County Treasurer as a trustee wrongfully transfered the funds
to the wrongful enrichment of the Co·c.nty General Fund.
no dispute that the County has consistently diverted all

There.,
inte~i

earned on tax monies improperly withheld to its own purposes.
It has consistently refused to tender such money to the

Distri~

Such conduct constitutes an intentional and wrongful abuse of
trust

justify~~g

the imposition cf compound interest.

As a consequence of the County's breaches of trust, the
District has been denied the interest it could have earned, if
it had the use of the tax monies on the dates they were required
to be paid.

This is the true measure of the District's loss for

which it must be compensated.

See In re Listman's Estate, supra

197 P. at 602.

As an alternative measure of damages and to prevent unjust
enrichment, the District is at least entitled to a sum equal ta
the interest which the County earned or could have earned ·.viul2 had District monies in its possession.
In Listman's Estate, the Utah Supreme Court held that an
executor who failed to comply with a court order directing him
to invest estate monies in government bonds, and instead invesu:

- 3;; -
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--in a bank which failed, was liable as a trustee for the
principal and interest which would have accrued had the executor invested in government bonds.

As stated b~ the Court:

The actual loss sustained by the estate ought to be the
measure of damages, we think, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, where the specific direction
of the court's order was to invest in bonds that would
have earned for the respondents no more than 4-1/4 percent interest per annum.
Id. at 602.
Such a sum should include compound interest where a
trustee intentionally and wrongfully diverts and uses trust
funds for his own private purposes the court may require
compound interest.

See In re Listman's Estate, supra, 197 P.

at 602; Gordon vs. Brunson, 253 So. 2d 183 (Ala. 1971); Pullis
v. Somerville, 117, S.W.

736

(Mo. 1909).

Assuming, arguendc, that Salt Lake Count] is net a
Trustee of monies collected for Granite School uistrict, Salt
Lake County is nonetheless liable co Granite School District
for interest at the legal rate for the unlawful delay in
paying a legitifuate indebtedness.
As a general rule, a debt is any lia!1lity to pay a sum
certain whether that liability arises by contract or is imposed
by law without contract.

2 6 C. J. S. Debt at 3 ( 19 5 6) •

A "statutory obligation in the nature of a debt bears
interest even though the statute creating the obligation fails
to provide for it."

United States v. United Drill Corp., 183

F.2d 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see also, Reserve Supply Corp.

v. National Labor Relations Board, 317 F.2d 785, 789 (2d. Cir.
1%3).

Units of local or state government are not exempt from

-
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the above rule.

Milwaukee County v. Schmidt, 187 N.W. 2d 77

(Wis. 1971); City of Wauwatosa v. Union Free High School Dist.,
252 N.W. 351

(Wis. 1934).

In Milwaukee County, interest was

allowed on state aid adjudged due to counties from the state
department of health.

In City of Wauwatosa, a plaintiff city

brought an action against a school district for the payment of
tuition owed to the city under a statute which required schcol
districts in which no high school was maintained to pay the
tuition of students residing in such districts, but who were
attending high school in other districts.

The court held that

the plaintiff was entitled to recover monies due for the

tuiti~

of defendant's students who were attending the city's high
school plus interest on such monies.
The long standing rule i:-i Utah and the common law is that
interest is allowed on debts overdue even if there is no
providing for interest.
Company, 24 P. 586

sta~u

Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining

(Utah 1890), aff'd 151 U.S. 317, 38 L.Ed.

177 (1894); Goodbe v. Young, 82 U.S. 562, 565, 21 L.Ed. 250,
251,

(1873).
Political subdivisions are not exempt from the general

obligation to pay interest on their overdue debts.
Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., 178 P. 764
Lake City, 174 P. 847

(Utah 1918).

Baker Lumber

(Utah 1919); Wilson v. Salt
In Baker Lumber Co., t'.12

Supreme Court held that a school district was required to ?aY '
rerest at the legal rate on a debt owed to companies which fun~
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--materials and labor for the construction of a school building.
concluding that there was no reason why a public corporation should
be treated differently from individuals, upon failure to meet
legally authorized obligations, the Court said:
Public policy, it seems to us, should require a public
corporation to meet its obligations legally authorized
when due, and upon failure to do so that it be subjected
to the same duty as probate individuals -- to reimburse
the creditor for his forebearance or delay in receiving
what is his due.
Baker Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., supra, 178 P. at 770.
In the case at bar, there are no legitimate grounds in
either public policy or law, for exempting Salt Lake County from
an obligation to reimburse Granite School District for the delay
in receiving tax monies due to the District.

To permit Salt Lake

County to escape paying interest would be to provide the worst
~css~ble

example to private citizens in settling their debts and
Moreover, it 1vould remove any incentive to Salt

La~e

County to meet its statutory obligations in the future.

Therefore, Plaintiff should be entitled to recover interest on all
overdue sums at the legal rate of six percent from the dates the
sums should have been paid.

U.C.A. §15-1-1 (1953); Baker Lumber

Co. v. A. A. Clark Co., supra, 178 P. 764.
Such overdue sum should include compound interest.

Utah

courts have ruled that a creditor -- in the absence of an agreernent -- is entitled to interest on all interest due and payable
at the legal rate of six percent per annum.

Farnsworth vs. Jensen,
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217 P.2d 571
(Utah 1915);

(Ctah 1950); Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. 19J6
see also U.C.A. §15-1-1

(1953).

V. CONCLUSION
Salt Lake County is a public trustee of tax monies collect
for Granite School District.

the County's funds no matter the opinion of the County
to the tontrary.

~c-

The School District's funds are

Treasu~=

Utah law requires the County Treasurer to

?~

such money in his hands collected to the District en the first
day of each month.

In failing to pay tax monies when lawfully

during the tax years 1973 through 1977, the County Treasurer
tentionally comini tted a breach of trust.

i~

He compounded his mis·

appropriation of funds by retaining interest earned on the tax
monies and paying the same to his principal, the general fund

o:!

Salt Lake County.
At law, the measure

the D1s::rict is that sum

which will comi:;er:sa':e the District fer the loss of t:ie use of it:
Specifically, the measure is that interest which the

money.

District could ha'!e earned

b~·

lac,v"f:.il in,_,estment ; if the County

had made timely payments.

At equity as alleged, the District

measure of damages is the sum which the County Treasurer earned
on the monies wrongfully detained and paid over to the general
fund of Salt Lake County plus legal interest from the date of
payment to Salt Lake County general fund until paid to Plainti'.'
herein.
This judgment of Judge David K. Winder should be reinstate·:
the interest income due determined by remand to the District
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court for a proper determination of damages at equity plus legal
interest and for injunctive relief requiring proper and statutorily required timely transfer of funds.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1981.
FABIAN

By:

& CLE~lDENDl

?Jf ~~th:- 7:::Z.,z

M. Byon Fisher

M. Byron Fisher
Charles B. Casper
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Tele;:ihone (801) 531-8900
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CERTIFICATE OF

~11-\ILDiG

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT to Ted Cannon,
Salt ~ake County Attorney a~d Bill Thomas Peters, Special
Deputy County Attorney, Atcor~e;s for ~efendants, Respondents
and Cross Appellants, 400 Chancellor Building, 220 South 200
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 postage prepaid on this 0~
day of January, 1981.
---FABIAN & CLENDENIN
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a
body politic of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Case No. 17175

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic and ARTHUR MONSON,
Salt Lake County Treasurer,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross Appellants.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT

Plaintiff inadvertently left off the citation to Attorney
General's Opinion cited on page 30 of its Brief.

That citation

is Opinion No. 77-002 dated January 25, 1977, a copy of the opinion
is included in the transcript of record pp. 72-75.
DATED this

~ 7 #(day

~

of January, 1981
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

By:

/I{./$~ F..::::h!t

M. Byrl'lFiSher
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

